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Abstract
Until the global outbreak of Coronavirus 2019
(COVID-19), little attention had been paid to the
possibility that a significant number of critical
personnel in both the infrastructure and disaster
response and recovery supply chains could be
incapacitated or otherwise unavailable due to an ongoing pandemic. The purpose of this paper is to use
CRISIS, an existing decision-support optimization tool
for the restoration of civil infrastructure damaged by a
hurricane, to investigate how a community’s Time To
Recovery (TTR) following a hurricane could be
extended due to an on-going pandemic and what the
consequences could be. The results of preliminary
modeling presented here suggests that the impacts
could be significant and that our current
understanding of such compound extreme events is
inadequate to the potential threat.

1. Introduction
Throughout the Spring and Summer of 2020, the
United States was in the midst of a public health crisis
unprecedented in over a century. During this time,
most of the country was in some stage of self-imposed
quarantine, the economy suffered as 2nd Quarter GDP
fell at an annual rate of 32.9% [1] and unemployment
reached levels not seen since the Great Depression [2],
and by the end of September the death toll exceeded
200,000 Although the impacts of COVID-19 were
devastating, on-going pandemics do not preclude the
occurrence of hurricanes or other extreme events. In
order to assess how a nation struggling with an
infectious disease crisis might cope with a concurrent
natural or human-caused disaster, the authors used
CRISIS, an existing decision-support optimization tool
for the restoration of civil infrastructure damaged by a
hurricane, and CLARC, an artificial community data
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set, to investigate how a community’s Time to
Recovery (TTR) following a hurricane could be
extended due to an on-going pandemic. The purpose of
this paper is to describe the preliminary results from
that exercise, suggest some policy steps that could be
taken at the national level, and identify future research
directions.

2. Background
By the end of September 2020, the total number of
COVID-19 cases in the United States exceeded 7
million with more than 200,000 virus-related deaths
reported [3]. To prevent the spread of the virus,
communities practiced social distancing, wearing face
masks, and other practices recommended by the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC). Self-quarantining
for 14 days was also recommended if there was reason
to believe that a person had been in contact with
someone carrying the virus. Demographic factors
played a role in vulnerability to the virus with people
in poverty, those over 65 years of age, and those with
pre-existing medical conditions particularly vulnerable
[4]. Coincidentally, this is the same demographic mix
that has been found to be particularly vulnerable during
a hurricane [5].
Coastal cities are most exposed to hurricanes
whose impacts include heavy rain, high winds, and
storm surge that damage buildings and infrastructure.
Power and water outages are typical and vary due to
the intensity of the storm. Hurricanes also damage
roads which are critical during evacuations, response,
and restoration. Although powerful hurricanes are
often considered rare and unpredictable events, they
are likely to become more intense and more frequent in
the future. Freedman [6] explains that there has been a
significant increase in a measure of hurricane intensity
called the power dissipation index since at least 1970.
This index includes wind speed and the total lifetime of
the storm and model simulations of the 21st century
shows the index increasing by 45% along with a 40%
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global increase in major hurricanes (Category 3 and
greater) during the same period. Other sources such as
the National Environmental Education Foundation [7]
and National Geographic [8] support this finding. The
prediction of an increasing number of more powerful
hurricanes in conjunction with the current pandemic
raises new concerns. To put an exclamation point on
these predictions, as of the end of September 2020,
there were 23 named storms in the Atlantic and Gulf of
Mexico, including 8 hurricanes, two of which were
considered major.
Thinking about preparing for and responding to a
natural hazard while in the middle of a public health
emergency is not a typical planning exercise. During a
recent webinar on extreme events and the COVID-19
pandemic sponsored by the National Academies, Jane
W. Baldwin of the Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory
observed that an extreme weather event occurring
during the COVID-19 outbreak would create what she
termed a “compound extreme event,” which is “a series
of events that are worse than the sum of their parts”
[9]. Typically, in preparation for a hurricane’s landfall,
people living in vulnerable locations are encouraged to
evacuate; out of the area if they have the resources to
do so or to shelters if they do not. Sheltering hundreds
of people in close proximity in, for example, a high
school gymnasium with limited restroom capacity is
precisely what social distancing seeks to avoid and it
remains unclear whether people will voluntarily
subject themselves to the perceived risk this entails.
Contemporary experience with a cyclone in
Bangladesh and a dam collapse and flooding in
Michigan suggests that they may not [10]. Although
there are many questions raised by the prospect of a
hurricane intersecting with an-ongoing pandemic, this
paper focuses on the role played by the availability of
critical personnel in a community’s post-event Time to
Recovery (TTR).

3. Method and Materials
To assist in better understanding these and related
questions, the performance of critical civil
infrastructures, defined as the ability of a system to
meet the demand for services, during a hurricane was
modeled using CRISIS, a computer-aided decisionsupport model developed at Rensselaer Polytechnic
Institute to optimize the scheduled repair of damaged
civil infrastructures based on stakeholder-determined
priorities for the restoration of social infrastructure
services that depend on the damaged civil systems.
[11]. CRISIS is composed of two principal parts, a
damage/disruption simulation model for civil and
social infrastructure systems and a restoration
optimization model that is guided by community-

determined priorities for the recovery of social
infrastructure services and the disrupted state of the
civil infrastructure systems on which the social
infrastructures depend. The underlying premise of
CRISIS is that because of interdependencies,
disruptions to civil infrastructure services such as
power, transportation, communications, and water and
sewer service will impact the delivery of social
infrastructure services as surely as collapsed or flooded
buildings. For example, it does not identify police
stations or medical facilities damaged by a hurricane
that need to be rebuilt; rather, it identifies and
schedules repairs to the flooded roadways and
damaged bridges on which emergency vehicles, repair
crews, and people requiring treatment must travel, and
the power lines, water, sewer, and communication
facilities that enable the disrupted facilities to function.
It does so by determining the optimal strategy for
repairing the damaged civil systems so that critical
social infrastructure services will be restored as rapidly
as possible. The logic flow of the model is shown in
Figure 1. As a result, minimizing the Time to Recovery
(TTR) of these systems following a hurricane is a high
priority [9] and TTR with and without an on-going
pandemic was selected as a surrogate measure of
COVID-19 impact. Figure 2 illustrates the
interdependencies
between
civil
and
social
infrastructures and the critical role of people both in
the provision and consumption of social infrastructure
services and in response and recovery operations that
CRISIS models.
Despite a long and well chronicled history of
global disasters, the meaning of “recovery,”
particularly at the community level, remains difficult to
define quantitatively. Quarantelli [12] called it “ an
attempt to bring a post-disaster situation to a level of
acceptability” which Alesch expanded to encompass “
the rectification of damage and disruption that has been
inflicted upon an urban system’s built environment,
people and institutions” [13]. More recently, the United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction [14] has
defined disaster recovery as “The restoring or
improving of livelihoods and health, as well as
economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental
assets, systems and activities, of a disaster-affected
community or society, aligning with the principles of
sustainable development and “build back better”, to
avoid or reduce future disaster risk.” This has led to
many efforts to develop metrics to measure and
monitor recovery efforts. For example, Horney, et. al.
[15] found over 500 possible recovery indicators in a
literature review. However, regardless of how we
define it, full community recovery from an extreme
event typically takes many years and is probably better
conceptualized as an on-going journey rather than one
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Figure 1. Logic flow of the CRISIS infrastructure damage-disruption-restoration model.

Figure 2. The interdependencies between civil and social infrastructures and the people
who operate, repair, and consume their services.
with a fixed destination. In light of this, the current
effort focuses on a single but essential element in the
recovery process; the restoration of civil infrastructure
disrupted by an extreme event. Using civil
infrastructure as a surrogate for recovery is considered
reasonable because all other sectors, public and private,
require civil infrastructure to function. If infrastructure
recovery lags, community recovery cannot proceed
effectively. In the absence of reliable quantitative data
for system performance during an actual
hurricane/pandemic event, the modeling on which this
analysis is based was conducted in CLARC, an

artificial community that was developed concurrently
with CRISIS to serve as a test bed for the model [16].
CLARC is structured as a hurricane-prone coastal
county of approximately 1,065 square miles with a
population of 500,000. The CLARC data set includes
civil and social infrastructures as well as selected
demographic and geographic data such as population,
average income, terrain type, and Social Vulnerability
Index (SoVI) [17]. Selected characteristics of the civil
and social infrastructures contained in the CLARC data
set are summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1. CLARC Infrastructure Classification Scheme

Classification

Operational Characteristic for Modeling

Civil
Infrastructure
Systems

A system in which goods or services flow
instantaneously in an autonomous network from supply
sources to fixed demand points

Power, Water, Wastewater,
Transportation, Communications

Public Safety

A system in which services flow through the
transportation network from discrete supply points to
randomly located demand points

Emergency Management Services
(EMS), Police, Firefighters

Critical
Commercial
Services

A system in which goods or services flow through the
transportation network from production sites, to
distribution centers, to supply points where they are
obtained by customers who must also travel to the
supply points

Fuel Distribution, Personal Banking
Services, Food Distribution,
Pharmaceuticals

Community
Services

A system in which people move through the
transportation network to fixed supply points to obtain
services.

Healthcare, Shelters, Government
Facilities

To model a theoretical hurricane, CRISIS uses the
storm parameters typically provided by the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
(e.g., intensity, path, radius to a given wind speed,
translation speed, and central pressure) as inputs to
HAZUS-MH® to calculate the maximum wind speeds
and flood levels expected in a given region. Once the
wind speeds and flood levels are estimated, the
probability that buildings and infrastructure would be
damaged as a result can be determined. The
probabilities corresponding to full, partial, and no
function are determined and plotted to 3 decimal
places, i.e., 0.xxx. The estimated level of damage
sustained is then simulated using Monte Carlo
techniques to generate a 3-decimal random number and
the combined results of many simulations performed
for each infrastructure component in the affected area
produce a damage scenario which is then translated
into service outages. The effects of these outages are
determined both for operational issues, i.e., does a
social infrastructure such as a dialysis center have
electric power and water to deliver services to
customers; and supply chain issues, i.e., is the
infrastructure necessary for patients and healthcare
workers to access the dialysis center functioning [18].
Based on a set of stakeholder-determined priorities,
CRISIS’s restoration solver then develops an optimal
restoration plan for that scenario by solving for the best

Examples

schedule and assignment of work crews that will
restore each damaged infrastructure component in the
shortest amount of time to maximize, in terms of met
demand, the following objective function for the three
sets of social infrastructures summarized in Table 1.
∑ 𝑊 𝑆x Π𝑆 + ∑ 𝑊 𝑆x Π𝑆 + ∑ 𝑊 𝑆x Π𝑆
𝑠∈𝑆 𝑃𝑆

𝑠∈𝑆 𝐶𝐶

𝑠∈𝑆 𝐶𝑆

(1)

where Π 𝑆 = the overall performance of a social
infrastructure system; 𝑆 𝑃𝑆 = set of systems within the
public safety category; 𝑆 𝐶𝐶 = set of systems within the
critical commercial services category; and 𝑆 𝐶𝑆 = set of
systems within the community services category. For
all three categories, each system is weighted
independently by a factor, 𝑊 𝑆 . Weighting each system
serves two purposes. First, it allows the decision maker
to prioritize one system’s performance over the others
based on community preferences. For example, to
determine the optimal restoration plan to maximize just
the performance of the emergency management system
(EMS), the public safety system would be given a
weight of 1, whereas the other two systems are given a
weight of 0. In this example, CRISIS seeks to
maximize Π 𝑆 , the performance, in terms of met
demand, of the Public Safety component of social
infrastructure (Equation 2).
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Π 𝑠 = ∑ (HW × ∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑠 × (𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑠 )
𝑡=1,…,𝑇

(2)

𝑖∈𝑉 𝑠−

−

∑

𝑠
∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑧 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑧
) ∀∈ 𝑆 𝑁

(𝑖,𝑗)∈𝐸 𝑠 ∪𝐸̅ 𝑠 𝑧={1,2}

The first term in this equation is the penalty for not
meeting the demand for emergency services; the
second term is the sum of the amount of time that the
emergency services uses in responding to the demand;
𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑠 = adjusted demand level for service s at node i in
𝑠
time period t; and 𝑣𝑖𝑡
= amount of demand met at node
i in time period t. Each demand node is weighted
𝑠
independently by 𝑤𝑖𝑠 . For the second term, 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡𝑧
=
flow of service s on arc i,j,z in time period t and 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑧 =
time traversing arc i,j,z. In order to balance the two
terms and because it is important that the demand for
public safety is met even at a high cost, a moderately
heavy weight HW is put on the term for unmet
demand. This weight should be just large enough to
ensure that meeting demand is always the priority over
the cost of meeting the demand.
Because roads are used by utility workers to
restore other damaged infrastructure, public safety and
EMS vehicles, households to obtain food and other
essential items such as medicine, and government
officials and volunteers to begin recovery operations,
roads and intersections are some of the most important
restoration priorities. In the examples described herein,
CRISIS models the varying effects that COVID-19
could have on community recovery by alternately
increasing the demand for public safety and EMS
workers and decreasing the supply of these workers
due to isolation and illness during hurricanes of
varying intensities.
The performance of several commercial supply
chains during the COVID-19 pandemic prove
illustrative for the critical role played by people in the
production and delivery of vital goods and services
[17,18,19]. At the most basic level, supply chains are
nothing more than networks of public and private
infrastructures arrayed to deliver everything from raw
materials to finished products to demand points along
the chain. During extreme natural events such as
hurricanes or earthquakes, links in the supply chain
usually breakdown due to damage to supporting civil
infrastructure such as power, water, or transportation or
to direct damage to processing or production facilities.
During the COVID-19 pandemic, however, physical
damage was not the issue. Instead, it was the
unavailability of workers, either through isolation,
incapacitation, or travel restrictions that was the source
of disruption.

Because of the exploratory nature of this work, a
range of scenarios were selected to determine the
sensitivity of the model to bounding conditions. Two
baseline scenarios determined the damage and
disruption a hypothetical hurricane would cause when
there is no pandemic and when there is a pandemic but
no hurricane. The second scenario examines the
difference in impacts between a Category 2 and a
Category 3 hurricane and which infrastructures are
damaged and disrupted when there is no pandemic.
These categories were selected based on prior
experience with the model wherein Category 1 storms
produced little significant damage and the damage
from Category 4 and 5 storms was so severe that the
model could not generate a restoration solution within
the time frames allotted. The third scenario models
Category 2 and Category 3 hurricanes occurring during
an on-going pandemic with only 50% and 75% of the
normal workforce available coupled with the increased
demand for these workers that would be expected
during a hurricane. Again, these levels of workforce
participation were chosen to determine boundary
conditions rather than anticipating a specific event.

4. Findings
Together these scenarios demonstrate that there is
a range of possible outcomes if no pre-event actions
were taken to address workforce reductions if a
hurricane occurred during an on-going pandemic.
For the purpose of this exercise, it was assumed that
an increase in response time could be generated by two
distinct events; physical damage to the roadway network
caused by a hurricane that would delay response or a
shortage of repair crews caused by the pandemic. The
total amount of time that it takes to respond to and
complete a repair demand generated by the model was
chosen as the metric to compare pandemic to nonpandemic response situations.
Among the most significant findings are:
1. There are increased outages of civil infrastructure
with pandemic-induced workforce reductions. A
baseline scenario was run for Category 2 and 3
hurricanes with no pandemic and then a pandemic
situation where workforce capacity was reduced
by 25% and 50%. The model generated more
infrastructure outages during a pandemic situation.
2. In analysis of the runs, a need to restore damaged
infrastructure was generated 3 times more
frequently in water and power systems than other
civil infrastructures.
3. The greatest disruption of civil infrastructure
occurs after the loss of the first 25% of workers.
This is based on a comparison of multiple
scenarios to determine the number of cases where
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a decision to restore damaged infrastructure was
generated. These comparisons included (a)
Category 3 storm baseline vs 50% personnel
reduction, (b) Category 3 storm baseline vs 25%
personnel reduction, (c) Category 2 storm vs 50%
personnel reduction, (d) Category 2 storm baseline
vs 25% personnel reduction, (e) Category 2 storm
with 25% personnel reduction vs 50% reduction,
(f) Category 3 storm with 25% personnel
reduction vs 50% reduction. In Category 2
hurricanes there were ~9 times more restoration
decisions generated in the loss of the first 25% of
workforce and a Category 3 storm produced
similar results.
4. Modeling a pandemic scenario with the assumed
personnel reductions of 25% and 50% delayed the
start time and increased the time required to
complete restoration by a factor of three when
compared to a “no pandemic” situation.
5. When the demand for infrastructure services was
increased to reflect more citizens needing service
during a hurricane or pandemic and workforce
availability was held constant, the model
generated more outages that required restoration.
Three restoration scenarios are compared in Figure
3. The three runs represent a Category 3 hurricane with
full, half, and three-quarters of a functioning
workforce, respectively. During a hurricane where
there is no pandemic and the workforce is assumed to
be at full capacity (Run 4), Figure 3 shows that no
restoration demands are generated within the allotted
twelve 6-hour units of time (72 hours). When only half
of the workforce is available (Run 5), the model
generates four restoration demands that require up to
three units of time (18 hours) to complete as shown in
the “Finish” column. Where 25% of the workforce is
unavailable (Run 6), there are two restoration actions
needed. Both restoration actions can begin earlier than
when the workforce is at half capacity. In one instance,
one 6-hour time unit earlier, and in the other, five time
units earlier.
As previously noted, if the workforce is decreased
to 75% of normal capacity during a pandemic, the
restoration of service after a hurricane would take three
times longer which could result in larger economic
impacts and more adverse healthcare outcomes. The
initial 25% depletion of workers was also found to be
the most critical. Over many runs of the model, when
total outages of civil infrastructure increased during a
pandemic situation, there were 501 instances when the
workforce decreased to 75% capacity. As the

workforce continued to decrease, there were only an
additional 197 outages at 50% capacity. Additionally,
the total number of outages were two and a half times
larger after the first 25% of workers became
unavailable to work than after workforce depletion
reached 50%.
Based on this modeling, an inverse relationship
appears to exist between workforce availability and
infrastructure performance, i.e., when the workforce is
decreased due to travel restrictions, isolation, or illness,
the number of civil infrastructure outages during a
hurricane increases as does response time to initiate
and complete a repair and overall TTR. Power and
water systems are three times more likely to be
disrupted than other civil infrastructures which is
significant because without functioning power and
water, many facilities providing healthcare, public
safety, and commercial services are not able to
function. However, even if there is little or no physical
damage, if the necessary workforce is not available to
provide service to their clients or customers at the point
of delivery, the result is the same; critical services will
not be available. This suggests that keeping workers
healthy and safe is just as important in preventing
outages and keeping the population safe during
disasters as is restoring facilities once damaged.
Findings from Hurricane Maria in 2017 [22] and
other recent storms [23] show a positive relationship
between increased TTR and adverse health outcomes.
This strongly suggests that delays in TTR caused by
the pandemic could exacerbate the negative health
impacts typically associated with hurricanes [5]. Thus,
the population most vulnerable to the pandemic, i.e.,
those living in nursing homes and temporarily in
shelters as well as those being treated in hospitals, are
also most at risk during a hurricane when fewer
emergency services are available. Reliable electricity
and water service are critical to this population because
many rely on medical devices to remain alive and air
conditioning to reduce the risk of heat stroke; potable
drinking water is required for hydration, medical
treatments such as dialysis, surgery, and sanitation.
This is an important consideration for decision makers
who need to put their resources into the most
vulnerable places first.
Although this modeling effort has confirmed some
obvious relationships and illuminated some that are
less so, it does have limitations. Its principal weakness
is that it begins to break down during very powerful
storms. At Category 3 and above, the hurricane
becomes too strong and destructive for the
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Figure 3. The impact of pandemic-induced workforce reduction on restoration activities
model to determine the number of workers needed to
keep the civil infrastructure intact. At this point, the
model will cease computing and the number of outages
predicted does not change regardless of workforce
availability or system demands. It is still important to
note, however, that this preliminary work does suggest
that a Category 1 or Category 2 hurricane occurring
during a pandemic might be manageable, for a
Category 3 or larger storm, that is unlikely. This is
supported, at least anecdotally, by the response to
Hurricane Laura [24].

5. Conclusion and Next Steps
In the event that a hurricane occurs during an ongoing pandemic, normal emergency response and
recovery procedures will probably be disrupted to
some degree. Using a virtual community to model
realistic scenarios for a compound extreme event such
as a hurricane and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, it
shows that decreasing the workforce due to the
pandemic and increasing the demands for emergency
services due to the hurricane would increase the
number of infrastructure service outages in a
community as well as extending TTR to some extent..
Planning and preparedness exercises should be
undertaken for a wide range of scenarios to inform
public and private decision-makers of the effectiveness
of alternative strategies for emergency response during
a future pandemic. Using decision-support tools such
as CRISIS and an artificial community such as
CLARC would be less costly and time intensive than
actual field exercises. There should also be efforts
undertaken by these same decision makers to improve
the personal protection of essential workers to reduce
their likelihood of contracting the infectious disease.
Some of the questions that this exercise raises for
decision makers and lawmakers to address include the
following: How will a mass evacuation be possible if
social distancing is a necessary precaution? Where will
evacuated people be placed if they are infected or
possibly infected? When power lines are damaged

during a hurricane, will workers be willing and able to
enter zones that have widespread outbreaks of
coronavirus? If hospitals or shelters exceed capacity,
will other states open their borders to people if they are
infected with the virus? Will FEMA Urban Search and
Rescue (USAR) teams and utility repair crews from
out of the affected area be available and deployable?
Will volunteers from NGOs such as the Red Cross and
Salvation Army, many of whom are in a vulnerable age
cohort, be available? Will workers providing critical
commercial services be available and able to work?
Although the CRISIS model was able to produce
some reasonable, broad-brush findings regarding a
compound extreme event, the nature of the model
required that infrastructure performance serve as a
surrogate for impact on a community. However,
COVID-19 has impacted people, directly if they were
infected themselves or indirectly if they were exposed
to an infected person or had to care for one, much more
so than physical systems. We have been able to
observe qualitative impacts of the coronavirus on
supply chains, construction, and utility maintenance
and repair for example, but are lacking quantitative
data to develop the realistic algorithms necessary to
predict how workforce availability, or lack thereof,
could impact future performance. Going forward,
simulation tools from the social sciences, such as
agent-based modeling may provide better insight into
these situations. What the present exercise has shown,
however, is that there are fundamental questions that
will need to be addressed regarding preparedness and
response for extreme events in the era of global
pandemics. COVID-19 will not be the last.
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